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1 Introduction
While the world has witnessed several exceptional advances in growth and development
achieved by developed and developing countries alike, the majority of developing
economies have made relatively modest gains. On the cross-country level, dynamics
within global distribution of income have been well researched and there exists little
disagreement about established stylized facts. Danny Quah (1996) has brought forward
solid evidence that cross-country distribution of incomes exhibits a tendency towards
polarization, clustering of countries into a higher and lower income groups, thus
forming a ‘twin peaked’ distribution. Furthermore, others have argued that there exists a
definite tendency for club formation (Baumol 1986). Poor economies have remained
relatively poor, as the correlation of income rankings between 1960 and 1998 is high
across countries implying a lack of upward mobility within and across income
rankings.1 Furthermore, repeated empirical observations supporting the absence of
absolute convergence within large cross-country samples have been brought forward.2
Baumol (1986) brings forth empirical evidence showing that less developed countries
have not converged, a result that is reiterated in Baumol and Wolff (1988).
While this research gives a bleak view of cross-country growth dynamics, it is not
deterministic in its conclusions. The evidence also shows that it is possible for an
economy to start initially at a low-income level, to achieve rapid growth, and to be able
to crossover to the richer income groups (e.g., Botswana, Singapore, and South Korea).
In other words, the possibility that a poor economy might converge with a rich one
remains; however, it seems to be much more of an exception than a rule.
A brief investigation into growth successes and failures across countries shows the
striking absence of long-term failures among ex ante high-income economies as well as
their prevalence within ex ante lower income groups, especially that of low-income
ones. In effect, there are groups of low-income and lower middle-income economies,
mostly located in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, that have
experienced persistent economic stagnation or even continuous regress for nearly four
decades.
This troublesome finding brings forth questions regarding the underlying forces
contributing to long-term growth failures. Are there particular factors that have impeded
these economies from achieving sustainable gains in development? Have there been
some common conditions that have contributed to the persistence of underdevelopment
in these economies? This paper uses the nature of natural resource endowment and its
influence upon political economy considerations to explain long-term growth or,
perhaps more appropriately, the lack of it in a group of developing economies. As initial
conditions analysis and cross-country growth regression framework are extended to
                                                
1 Note that high rank correlation does not show evidence against convergence, since it is possible to
observe absolute and conditional convergence among a group of economies that retain an identical
income ranking. Rank correlation between 1960 and 1998 for 102 economies with available data in
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2001) is 0.82.
2 These contributions include: Grier and Tullock (1989), Baumol and Wolff (1988), Barro (1991, 1997),
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).2
different types of natural resource endowment and to political economy considerations
such as lack of social cohesion, the empirical results bring forward evidence supporting
the argument most recently advocated in Auty (2001) and earlier in Hirschman (1981).
That is, natural resource endowment type and ensuing political economy considerations
bear significant influence on economic performance. The results presented suggest that
natural resource endowment predominated by oil and/or mineral exports when
coexisting with lack of social cohesion has potentially contributed to a number of severe
and even catastrophic growth failures. Similar effect is not present when considering
agricultural commodity producing economies and lack of social cohesion. The
robustness of this result is tested across a number of growth regression specifications
within the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Simple statistical analysis in section 2 highlights some
stylized facts of growth failures: their regional concentration in Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America and the Caribbean and the predominance and the long-term nature of
growth failures in ex ante low-income and lower middle-income economies. Drawing
upon the literature on African growth failures and that on the natural resource curse
thesis, the following section, section 3, discusses the previous contributions explaining
some possible reasons for persistently poor economic performance. Section 4 introduces
the regression methodology as well as the sample and data sources used to conduct the
analysis. The results, in turn, are discussed in section 5. Section 6 then briefly
summarizes the empirical findings and provides concluding remarks. Details on the
stage of development categorizations used in this paper and information on the
calculations and the sources of the variables used are provided in the appendix.
2 Stylized facts of growth failures: geography, size, and stage of development
A brief investigation into long-term growth failures shows that they are regionally
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean and that they
tend to occur at early stages of development in economies characteristic of small size.
Table 1 lists long-term growth failures that are categorized based on the decade during
which the level of current real per capita income was first reached.3 Catastrophic
growth failure is considered to have occurred in economies which attained their
contemporary real per capita income (PCI) level during 1960s or before. It can be
observed that the economies fitting this criterion are mostly located in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) and, to a much lesser extent, in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Severe growth failure, in turn, is considered to have occurred in those economies that
have had more than a decade of stagnation having reached their current real per capita
income level either during 1970s or 1980s. Again, the regional representation is largely
the same, although a few Middle East and North African (MENA) economies and one
East Asia and Pacific economy (Philippines) also belong to this group. This confirms
with the evidence that East Asia and Pacific as well as South Asian economies have
experienced strikingly strong growth. Not surprisingly, all long-term growth failures
have occurred in developing economies. It is remarkable to observe that growth in over
43 percent of all economies has failed and more than a half (56.2 percent) of all
                                                
3 See Table A1 for a list of economies included in this analysis.3
Burundi Somalia Cameroon Guyana
Central African Republic South Africa Congo, Rep. Honduras
Chad Togo Kenya Paraguay
Congo, Dem. Rep. Zambia Malawi Peru
Cote d'Ivoire Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Ghana Bolivia Mauritania
Liberia Haiti Nigeria Iran
Madagascar Jamaica Zimbabwe Jordan
Niger Nicaragua Saudi Arabia
Rwanda Venezuela Ecuador
Senegal El Salvador Philippines
Sierra Leone Guatemala
b Severe growth failure is considered to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was
reached during 1970s or 1980s.
Table 1 Economies with Persistent Growth Failures
Note: Sample includes a total of 95 economies with real per capita income series available in World Bank (2001). See
appendix for sample details. Countries are grouped according to their geographical region and ordered alphabetically within
regions.
a Catastrophic  growth failure is defined to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was




developing economies included in the analysis has suffered from a catastrophic or a
severe growth failure.
Table 2 lists those economies that have experienced more contemporary growth
setbacks, defined as 1999 real per capita income below that achieved in 1990.4 These
recent failures consist of 20 economies, only one of which is a developed economy
(Switzerland). Again, the majority of recent growth disasters have been experienced in
the SSA region with LAC as a distant second. Furthermore, all recent growth failures,
with the exception of Switzerland, are long-term growth failures. It is especially
troublesome to observe that twelve of the economies that have suffered from a
catastrophic growth failure as well as seven from a severe one have continued their
descent up until the late 1990s. In the worse case scenarios, this translates into more
than ‘four lost decades’ of standard of living improvement.
While it is evident that growth failures have occurred in developing economies,
especially in SSA as well as LAC, it is informative to analyze whether any empirical
regularities can be deduced from investigating successful growth experiences. Table 3
hence displays relative growth success economies with per capita income higher in 1999
(or 1998) than ever before. There are a total of 52 growth successes, 19 of which are
                                                




























Table 2 Recent Growth Failures
Note: Sample includes a total of 95 economies with real per capita income series available in
World Bank (2001). See appendix for further details. Countries are grouped according to their
geographical region and ordered alphabetically within regions. Developed countries in italics.
b Countries with continuing severe growth setbacks.
aCountries with continuing catastrophic growth failures.
Burkina Faso Australia Austria Cyprus











b Greece Syrian Arab Republic
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Costa Rica New Zealand Portugal
Dominican Republic Pakistan Spain
Mexico Singapore Sweden




a Per capita income peaked in 1998.
Table 3 Relative Growth Successes
Source: Constructed by the author based on World Bank (2001).
Note: Sample includes a total of 95 economies with available statistics. See appendix for sample
details. Countries are grouped according to their geographical region and ordered alphabetically within
regions. Developed countries in italics.
bCountry categorized as growth success based on long term performance. See figure A1 in appendix
for a graph of the logarithm of per capita income.5
developed economies, while the rest can be considered as developing ones.5 Their
regional distribution concentrates on Asia and Western Europe, although a number of
economies from LAC, MENA, as well as a few from SSA are also present.
It is clear that failing growth is characteristic of low and lower middle-income
economies. To illustrate this Table 4 displays the percentages of growth failures and
successes by initial income level and size. The first row shows that high-income








High 0 0 0 5.9 0 94.1
Middle
Upper 13.6 22.7 36.4 13.6 13.6 63.6
Lower 27.3 31.8 59.1 18.2 18.2 40.9
Low 35.3 23.5 58.8 35.3 35.3 38.2
Size
Large
> 25 million 0 11.1 11.1 5.6 5.6 88.9
> 20 million 0 14.3 14.3 4.8 4.8 85.7
> 15 million 8.0 12.0 20.0 12.0 4.0 80.0
> 10 million 6.9 10.3 17.2 10.3 3.4 82.8
Small
< 25 million 27.3 23.4 50.6 24.7 23.4 46.8
< 20 million 28.4 23.0 51.4 25.7 24.3 45.9
< 15 million 27.1 34.3 51.4 24.3 22.9 45.7
< 10 million 28.8 25.8 54.5 25.8 24.2 42.4
Mini
f 5.9 35.3 41.2 26.5 20.6 52.9
e Size of an economy approximated by population size.
f Defined as those economies with population less than half a million in 1960.
b Severe growth failure is considered to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was reached during 1980s or before.
c Recent growth setback is defined as 1999 real per capita income level below that of 1990.
d Growth success is defined as 1999 or 1998 real per capita income above that in 1990. See footnote 5 for a more detailed description of the classification
method.
Degree of long term failure Recent growth setbacks
c
Note: All calculations based on 1960 groupings. See appendix for sample description, group definitions and membership.
a Catastrophic growth failure is defined to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was reached during 1960s or before.
e
                                                
5 One must note that the influence of the recent Asian crisis is stronger with growth successes than with
failures. Since the crisis began in mid 1997, many Asian economies’ real per capita incomes fell
sharply; however, they remained clearly above their 1990 level. Even broadening the success criterion
to suit the long run nature of the analysis by including economies which 1998 per capita income is
higher than that of 1990 leads to the exclusion of relative growth success economies, such as Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand. Hence for those economies that did not fall into any
of the growth failure categories nor that of success, a graphical examination of the logarithm of per
capita income was conducted. This analysis lead to the inclusion of the above-mentioned Asian
economies as well as Brazil and Colombia into the relative growth success category, and in addition, it
showed that Papua New Guinea could be considered neither a success nor a failure as the pattern of its
per capita income level differed significantly from that of others.6
economies have seen no long-term growth failures and only a small percentage of the
group has experienced a recent growth setback. The picture changes quite sharply when
one moves from the upper income groups to the lower income ones. Clearly, economies
at earlier stages of development have had greater difficulties in sustaining growth than
those at higher income levels sustain. Furthermore, when investigating more recent
growth setbacks, it can be noted that failing growth is a persistent problem, since all
economies that suffer from recent growth setbacks are long-term growth failure
economies.
To consider whether failing growth is more common among economies of different
size, the bottom two-thirds of Table 4 shows the percentages of growth successes and
failures among large, small, and mini state economies groups.6 The data clearly shows
that small economies have suffered proportionally more from growth failures, whether
of long-term or short-term nature, in comparison to large economies. This also holds for
the long-term growth failures relative to that of mini state ones, and though mini state
economies register a larger proportion of recent growth failures, small economies group,
in turn, suffers from a higher proportion of continuing long-term growth failures.7
Furthermore, a greater proportion of large as well as mini economies belong to growth
success economies than small ones. These observations are robust across any large and
small economy cutoff point between 25 million or 10 million.
This striking pattern raises questions regarding the underlying forces contributing to
these growth failures at early stages of development. What factors have impeded these
economies from reaching a sustainable growth path? Are there common features that
have contributed to these long-term growth failures? Given the fact that a large majority
of these growth failures appear to have faced difficulties in initiating growth, it seems
appropriate to focus on initial conditions and endowments.
3 Explanations for failing growth
Various explanations for failing growth have been brought forward. This contribution
draws from two closely connected research lineages, one with a strong geographical
focus on African growth experience and another investigating the impact of natural
resource abundance on growth. The striking geographical concentration of failures
within Sub-Saharan Africa has fuelled much discussion focusing on this region’s
experience. In this regard, there have been heated debates on whether the causes of
failures are internal or external in nature. This growing literature brings forth a variety
of explanations for the prevalence of failing growth in this region including lack of
                                                
6 Given that there is no agreed definition of size and certain level of arbitrariness cannot be avoided
using any one criterion to define it, growth success and failure statistics are displayed for various
groups of large and small economies. Within the literature, size is generally defined either by area,
population, total economic activity, or purchasing power. Total population is chosen since using per
capita income to proxy for the purchasing power resembles the income level categorization too
closely. Furthermore, since the population size definition varies within the literature, it is modified at
an interval of five million inhabitants. Note also that the sample definition excludes mini state
economies from the analysis. Statistics are calculated for them in this table for the purpose of
illustrating the differences in performance of an average small economy and that of a city state.
7 This suggests that the emphasis on the recent size and growth literature is somewhat misplaced.7
openness, ethnic divisions, social conflict, and defective public policies. The natural
resource literature, for its part, focuses on explaining the mediocre growth performance
of resource rich economies in comparison to that of resource poor ones. The
explanations for this somewhat surprising phenomenon range from economic and
political to social influences that natural resources exert upon the growth and
development of an economy.
Africa’s economic performance during the second half of the twentieth century has
recently received much attention. The most forceful claim that lack of openness
hampers Africa’s economic progress has been made by Sachs and Warner (1997a).
While investigating the causes of Africa’s slow growth in cross-country framework,
they argue that it is not unique relative to other regions. Their empirical analysis
indicates that the region’s growth failure is mostly explained by poor policies and
institutions, most notably by lack of openness. While so-called ‘natural impediments’,
such as geographical factors and ethnic fractionalization, act as a hindrance, they do not
form insuperable obstacles to growth according to them. Collier and Gunning (1999)
and earlier Dollar (1992) also support the argument that lack of openness hinders
growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), however, find the evidence brought forward
unconvincing arguing that the indicators used in these studies are correlated with other
factors that impede growth.
Easterly and Levine (1997), in turn, regard Africa’s poor performance as a result of poor
policies caused by ethnic divisions which have a direct and indirect effect on growth.
They consider the latter effect, which acts through public policies, as much more
prevalent and important and present empirical evidence supporting the argument that
ethnic divisions encourage rent-seeking behavior and frustrate consensus building.
Though controlling for ethnic divisions is not enough to eliminate the negative
significant Africa dummy variable, the Easterly and Levine (1998) regression analysis
eliminates its significance through the inclusion of ‘neighborhood effects’, thus refuting
any claim for ‘exceptionalism’ of Africa’s experience in comparison to other regions.
Sachs and Warner also highlight the potential relevance of ethnic divisions on growth in
Africa, as they point out that their findings emphasizing policies ‘do not mean that
Africa’s colonial legacy, ethnic divisions, or particular geographical difficulties are
unimportant. The colonial legacy or ethnic divisions ... may help to explain Africa’s
poor choices of economic policy which in turn are responsible for much of the growth
shortfall according to our regression estimates’ (1997a: 336).
Other literature from which an explanation for these growth failures can be sought is
that which has concentrated on explaining the relatively mediocre growth performance
of natural resource rich economies in comparison to that of natural resource poor ones.
While repeatedly observed in case studies over the years, most recently Sachs and
Warner (1997b) brings forth robust cross-country evidence regarding the inverse
relationship between natural resource abundance and growth. The explanations for this
phenomenon vary from social and economic to political ones. The current paper draws
on those contributions emphasizing largely the political economy linkages, although
other types of contributions are also briefly reviewed below.
An argument which connects natural resource richness to behavior as well as to the
policy realm is the natural resource curse thesis, advanced and discussed in a number
of case studies such as Gelb and associates (1988). Auty (1995) argues that adverse
policy effects of large natural resource endowments manifest in the form of overly8
optimistic expectations of resource revenues and implementation of careless economic
policies. Furthermore, the consequences of the latter as well as other economic
imbalances can be sustained longer in resource rich economies than in resource poor
ones, thus causing delays in the necessary adjustments in order to attain competitive
forces within manufacturing. Support for this thesis has been found in a number of case
studies.
Another often cited phenomenon is the Dutch disease, dubbed after an observation of
deindustrialization (sectoral reallocation of resources away from manufacturing) in the
Dutch economy prompted by the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea during the
1970s. The boom of the natural resource sector created an increase in the price of
nontraded goods as a result of an increase in their demand, thus diverting resources
away from manufacturing. Similarly, the booming natural resource intensive sector can
reduce manufacturing sector profitability through increased competition in the capital
markets (or in the labor markets). The long-term growth consequences of this ‘malady’
can be devastating, especially given that the natural resource intensive sector is
generally relatively insular with minimal production-related forward and backward
linkages to the host economy. The manufacturing sector, in turn, relies on greater
division of labor, is potentially characteristic of increasing returns, and has generally
stronger positive technological and pecuniary externalities through which it promotes
more broad-based growth and development within the economy. The literature on Dutch
disease, reviewed in Corden (1984), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986), and Ros (2000),
discusses a number of different linkages through which this deindustrialization effect
can take place.
Another argument tied to the performance of natural resource rich economies is that of
the role of terms of trade that has been a source of much controversy. The origins of the
terms of trade discussion are generally attributed to the works of Raúl Prebisch (1950)
and Hans Singer (1950), who argued for a presence of structural tendencies (such as low
price elasticity of demand and supply, low-income elasticity of demand, innovations of
synthetic substitutes, control of technological superiority, and differing labor and
commodity market structures in developing and developed economies) that cause the
primary commodity exporting developing countries’ terms of trade to deteriorate with
respect to that of developed ones (Singer 1989). The outcomes of the policies following
from the recommendations of this strand of thought have been much discussed within
the literature on growth and development.
Economic instability is yet another factor highlighted within the literature explaining the
poor performance of natural resource rich economies. Instability is argued to be greater
when an economy is either small in size (Tarshis 1986) and/or largely a mineral
exporter (Gelb and associates 1988). The fluctuations in international prices of
country’s agricultural exports have been noted to be greater than that of manufacturing
ones, given that agricultural goods’ demand is price inelastic and supply varies with
climatic changes (Gelb and associates 1988). Furthermore, since the demand and supply
for mineral exports are both price inelastic and the former is influenced by economic
fluctuations in the developed countries, the prices of mineral exports can be expected to
be even more volatile (Gelb and associates 1988). Both of these tendencies can be
assumed to be stronger in the case of developing economies, since their export structure
tends to be more concentrated, relying on fewer primary and/or mineral exports. Under
these circumstances, international price fluctuation can generate economic booms and9
busts, causing instability and augmenting uncertainty, and thus, reducing investment
and growth.
While at a first glance the literature on natural resources and growth gives a pessimistic
impression with regards to natural resource endowments’ growth generating capacity, a
selective analytical survey of the economic mechanisms through which natural
resources can influence growth in Ros (2000) gives a more balanced view. The model
based comparison of the various linkages shows that the impact that natural resources
may have upon the economy depends on the nature of the sector(s) a resource boom
stimulates. This same notion is also present in Sachs and Warner (1999). They highlight
the potential growth impetus a natural resource boom can create through a generation of
a big push-like demand expansion. Furthermore, they emphasize that the potential
growth effect of a natural resource boom is contingent on timing and characteristics of
the sector stimulated by it. If the invigorated sector, traded or nontraded, is
characterized by increasing returns, growth effects of the boom can be beneficial and of
long-term nature. However, if the boom stimulates a sector not characterized by
increasing returns as opposed to a one that is, causing a reallocation of resources hereby
undermining the increasing returns sector, the negative growth consequences of the
boom can be long lasting. While the potential for a positive stimulus is present, the
preliminary empirical evidence brought forward in Sachs and Warner (1999) fortifies
the conventional, negative view, at least in the case of Latin American economies, for
none of the economies included in their analysis that have experienced a resource boom
have attained stronger growth afterwards.
Within the development economics literature, the importance of natural resource
endowment type to development and growth has been recognized most notably in
Hirschman (1981), and recently, empirical evidence for it has been brought forward in a
series of contributions included in Auty (2001). Hirschman (1981) broadens the notion
of linkages to entail consumption and fiscal linkages, in addition to the physical
production ones (backward and forward) discussed in Hirschman (1958), and applies
them to primary production, illustrating that the importance of a certain linkage might
arise from the nature of a particular economic activity. Mining and fossil fuel extractive
industries Hirschman considers as typical ‘enclaves’ that give rise to very limited
production and consumption linkages and hence the importance of fiscal linkage is
intensified. The development promoting capacity of each linkage is equal in
Hirschman’s mind, though the fiscal linkage is more indirect and the most challenging
one as it requires not only the ability to collect taxes but also well-designed
development policy as well as the capacity to implement it and to target the funds in
most productive activities (Hirschman 1981). Hirschman argues that the indirectness of
the fiscal linkages leaves more room for mistargetting of the funds and even for their
loss through rent-seeking. Since linkages promote development and growth, their
absence can hamper it. Hence, in this view, it is plausible that improper functioning of
the fiscal linkage, importance of which is bolstered by the absence of other consumption
and production interdependencies, can pose a serious impediment to development in
primary production activities characteristic of ‘enclaves’. Though considering mining
and fossil fuel extractive industries as particularly characteristic of this phenomenon,
Hirschman discusses the primary production in general terms and points out how certain
agricultural crops can lead to production processes with limited growth enhancing
linkages. Technological factors can be of importance as backward and forward linkages
in agricultural production can be missing when they require the local agents to have
technological ‘know how’ that is beyond their capacity.10
While pointing out that characteristic differences between staples can lead to distinct
development outcomes, Hirschman emphasizes that the technological aspects of the
staple production are not deterministic. Rather the sociopolitical environment in which
the staple production takes place also bears great relevance as to whether a particular
staple is able to generate more broad-based development. In this view, those economies
in which production units are characteristic of enclave type economic activity,
sociopolitical environment that is not conducive to coherent policy formulation and
aimed at maximizing the welfare for the society as a whole can stall the development
process. If, in turn, the socioeconomic environment is beneficial to long-term
development, the limited development potential of the staple due to limited or
nonexistent consumption and/or production linkages can be overcome through efficient
management of the fiscal linkage. Akin to Hirschman, recent contributions addressing
the role of natural resource endowment and its influence on political economy factors in
economic development by Auty (2001), in essence, emphasize the challenges that
natural resource rich economies experience in managing the fiscal linkage. The case
study contributions included in Auty (2001) bring forth evidence that economies
characteristic of concentrated rent flows (such as mineral economies) have
underperformed relative to those in which the rent flows are more widely dispersed
throughout the economy.
Given that these development economics contributions highlighting political economy
factors, much like the early contributions to resource curse thesis literature, are case
studies in nature and no empirical test on the fiscal linkage highlighted in Hirschman
(1981) exists in cross-country framework, this contribution addresses this shortcoming
and examines whether evidence for the notions brought forward in this literature,
emphasizing the importance of natural resource endowment type, can be found within
cross-country regression framework. If there is evidence that the type of natural
resource endowment matters in the presence of social factors that correlate with poor
policy environment then it is no surprise that natural resource booms especially that of
oil or minerals have not had a growth boosting effect as envisioned by the big push
literature.
Interestingly, as a point of departure from the general pessimism within the political
economy literature on natural resource endowment and growth, Auty (2001) brings
forth the argument that natural resource curse of developing countries is reversible,
since policy matters. He points out that natural resource curse is only characteristic of
post war development experience, as natural resource rich economies experienced a
stronger growth during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than resource poor
ones. Hence fast growth in these economies is possible. Further evidence supporting this
is the fact that though natural resource rich economies have underperformed during the
past three decades, even during this time one can find examples of fast growth in natural
resource rich economies, even those rich in mineral exports. Botswana, a mineral rich
economy, has managed to achieve the world’s fastest per capita growth rate of 6.1
percent over the period of 1960-99, climbing from low-income status to upper middle-
income one within a few decades.8
                                                
8 Other examples are Chile and Malaysia.11
4 Methodology
The possible correlation between growth and natural resource endowment type is first
investigated in a cross-country regression framework that associates initial conditions to
growth. Then the robustness of the correlation found is tested in a standard cross-
country growth regression framework within some common regression specifications,
such as Sachs and Warner (1997b), Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
King and Levine (1993), and DeLong and Summers (1991). To establish that natural
resource endowment type in fact matters for growth in the sense that economies
characteristic of ‘point’ rents (i.e., oil and/or mineral economies) and those with more
‘diffuse’ rent flows (i.e., agricultural economies) have differential impact on growth, the
same regressions are also run on the latter group.
4.1 Initial conditions analysis
Arguably initial conditions influence growth and development during the subsequent
period. Temple (1998) brings forth evidence that they potentially explain nearly a half
of cross-country variation in growth rates. Initial conditions are factors that can
generally be taken as given though there are others that can be argued to change
gradually over time. Social factors are of this type as they can be rigid, though through a
consistent policy, they can be influenced.
The initial conditions relationship to growth can be summarized as follows:
() ,... , , , ; ˆ 2 1 0 0 0 x x n h y f y =
Where  y ˆ  denotes growth rate of real per capita income, y0 and h0 denote initial level of
real per capita income and human capital, respectively, and n0 and x’s in turn, denote
initial natural resource endowment and political economy considerations as well as
other relevant variables such as institutions and geographical characteristics like climate
and access to sea.
The empirical equation estimated in the first part is formalized as follows:
i n n i x x x n h y g ε β β β α α α α + + + + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 0 3 0 2 0 1 0
Where gi denotes the average growth rate of country i over the period 1960-99, while
α 0, α 1, α 2, and α 3 stand for a constant and estimated coefficients for initial income,
human capital, and natural resource endowment, respectively. In turn, β ’s and x’s are
estimated coefficients and variables, respectively, that proxy for political considerations
as well as other relevant variables such as institutions and geographical factors. Lastly,
ε i stands for error terms with the usual assumptions.
4.2 Cross-country growth regression analysis
Given that the large majority of empirical literature on cross-country growth derives its
framework of analysis from the extended neoclassical growth model, the second half of
the empirical analysis in this study examines the robustness of the correlations found
within a number of different specifications brought forward in key contributions within12
this literature. This method is applied from Sachs and Warner (1997b) and it not only
helps to assess the relative robustness of the correlation found within other established
regression specifications, but it also helps in binding the present contribution into the
existing empirical literature in a manner that addresses one of the shortcomings of the
empirical cross-country literature. Namely, the fragility of results to any given
regression specification that is by now an established fact within the literature and
brought forward in studies by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
Following Barro (1997), a simple formalization of the extended neoclassical growth
regression framework is as follows:
() * , ˆ y y f y t =
Where  y ˆ  denotes the growth rate of real per capita income, yt is the level of real per
capita income at time t, and y*, in turn, denotes the steady state per capita income level.
Due to the convergence property of the neoclassical model  y ˆ  is a negative function of yt
and a positive one of y*, i.e., increase in the steady state income level as well as a
reduction in the initial income level both increase the growth rate and vice versa.
The empirical counterpart of the above equation is formalized as follows:
i i i X c g ε β + + =
'
Where gi denotes the average growth rate of country i over a specified period, while
c and β stand for a constant and a vector of estimated coefficients, respectively. In turn,
Xi is a vector of variables that proxy the steady state determinants for a country i, and
lastly, εi stands for error terms with the usual assumptions.
In an attempt to establish the relative robustness of the correlation, it is tested in the
presence of determinants of growth as suggested by established regression
specifications, such as Barro (1991), DeLong and Summers (1991), King and Levine
(1993), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Sachs and Warner (1997b).
4.3 Sample and data sources
The sample used in this study consists of market economies with a population of more
than a half a million in 1960. Market economies are economies characteristic of
nonsocialist economic organization as defined in table 7 of Gastil (1980). Within the
World Development Indicators 2001 database, there are 101 economies fulfilling the
above criteria, from which the following economies were excluded due to incomplete
data for the period of analysis: Eritrea, Germany, Libya, Namibia, and Uganda.
Furthermore, Oman was left out, as it did not fit the natural resource endowment
criteria.9 This left a total of 95 economies into the full sample for the growth failures
analysis. Furthermore, Barro and Lee (2001), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Penn
World Tables, mark 6 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2001) posed additional limitations,
                                                
9 Based on the first criterion, per capita cropland, Oman falls into natural resource poor economies
category, yet the second criterion, fuel and mineral exports as a percentage of GDP classifies it as an
economy rich in point source natural resources.13
leaving 82 economies in the full sample for the initial conditions regression analysis.
For a list of economies included in the sample, see Table A1 in the appendix.
The dependent variable for the initial conditions regressions, the logarithmic growth rate
of real per capita income, comes from the real income series of World Development
Indicators 2001 (WDI) database. Annual real per capita income growth is calculated
from local currency constant price series. This choice is made based on the
recommendation by Nuxoll (1994), and it is also a convenient choice given the fact that
it allows the largest sample with maximum number of observations for the time period.
The independent variables for the analysis are initial income and its square (to capture
the convergence effect) initial conditions, such as human capital, natural resource
endowment type (point source, diffuse, and poor), a proxy for lack of social cohesion,
and the latter interacted with natural resource endowment types. Initial income estimate
for 1960 is the purchasing power parity adjusted real per capita income for that year
from Penn World Tables, mark 6 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2001). Initial human
capital endowment is approximated by the estimates of total years of schooling per
capita for population over fifteen years of age provided in Barro and Lee (2001).
Natural resource endowment characterization, in turn, is a qualitative variable adopted
from Auty (2001) that distinguishes oil and mineral exporting countries from
predominantly agricultural exporting ones. Natural resource rich economies are
considered to be those with per capita cropland greater than 0.3 hectares. These
economies then are divided into two types based on the composition of their
merchandise exports. Those economies which fuel and mineral exports amount to more
than 40 percent of total exports are considered as point source economies, and the
remaining ones are defined as diffuse economies. The former group is characteristic of
high rents under concentrated ownership and limited production and consumption
linkages elevating the importance of prudent fiscal management and good policy. In the
latter group, in turn, rent revenues derived from agriculture are considered to be more
‘diffused’, spread across the economy and hence consumption and production linkages
can be expected to be much more prevalent. It is important to note, however, that the
distinction between point source and diffuse economies is not always clear-cut.
Hirschman (1981) points out that the nature of a fiscal linkage may change over time,
as, on occasions, has been the case with institutions like cocoa or coffee boards that at
first have been implemented to shield producers from the adverse effects of price
volatility and that later on have turned into a state taxing device.
When constructing the variable for empirical estimation, Auty (2001) categorization of
countries was followed, though those economies for which suitable data was available
but were missing in his analysis, and hence not classified by him, his classification
criteria was followed to distinguish between the type of natural resource endowment.
Furthermore, Auty (2001) refrains from classifying large economies as he does not
consider them to be as disadvantaged by natural resource richness as their small
economy counterparts, since their manufacturing potential is much larger. Given that
certain arbitrariness cannot be avoided in following any size definition, the economies
that Auty considers as large were also classified by natural resource endowment type
and no distinction for economy size was introduced into the regression analysis. The
rationale for doing this was that if evidence for the differential impact of natural
resource endowment type was found for the full sample, its influence can be expected to
be stronger in the case of small economies. Natural resource endowment classification14
was extended by using WDI 2001 data on fuel and ores and metals exports as a
percentage of merchandise exports.
Since Hirschman argues that for the process of economic development, not only do the
technological characteristics of the staple production matter but that features of the
sociopolitical environment also bear relevance whether a particular linkage, most
notably the fiscal one, has growth enhancing effect, cohesiveness of a society or its
absence can be considered to capture the sociopolitical environment in a given country.
Hence to capture the political economy challenge that a prudent management of natural
resource rents face, lack of social cohesion is proxied by ethnolinguistic
fractionalization index, used in Easterly and Levine (1997). They argue that a bulk of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization manifests itself in poor public policies, which is also
correlated with corruption according to Mauro (1995). Hence, the interaction term
between point source resource endowment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization seeks to
capture the culmination of rent seeking and deterioration in public and development
policies in economies with concentrated ownership and limited development potential
through consumption and production linkages. Alternatively, the interaction term
between diffuse resource rich economies and ethnolinguistic fractionalization seeks to
capture the same phenomenon in economies where rent flows are more dispersed
throughout the economy, generating consumption and production linkages that are more
conducive to growth.
In an attempt to establish the relative robustness of the correlation, it is tested in
established regressions specifications within the literature. This not only ensures that the
results are comparable with other central contributions within natural resources and
growth literature, but it also allows an assessment of the relative strength of the
estimated correlation within these contributions to cross-country growth literature. For
this part of the study, variation in the number of observation occurs depending on the
variables included in a given regression specification. In all cases, the sample consists
of an intersection of the initial conditions analysis sample (82 economies as discussed
above) and Sachs and Warner (1997b) dataset. For detailed definitions and sources of
the variables used in the robustness regressions, see section A4 in the appendix.
5 Empirical analysis
Table 5 modifies the previously discussed growth failures table in order to visualize the
natural resource endowment types of the troubled economies. The upper half of the
table presents country specific information, while the lower half provides summary
statistics on the degree of growth failure and the natural resource endowment type. The
data seems to confirm the previous findings within the natural resources and growth
literature as it can be observed that nearly 62 percent of resource rich economies suffer
from long-term growth failure, a proportion significantly greater than that among
resource poor economies. Furthermore, a difference between the relative performance
across resource rich economies groups can also be noted as an astonishing proportion,
77.3 percent, of point source economies suffer from a long-term growth failure in
comparison to 51.5 percent of economies characterized by diffuse natural resource
endowment. While close to a half of diffuse economies have experienced successful
growth, as expected, the resource poor economies register the highest proportion of






















































Resource endowment Catastrophic Severe All failures Success
Resource rich 34.5 27.3 61.8 36.4
Point source 45.5 31.8 77.3 18.2
Diffuse 27.3 24.2 51.5 48.5
Resource poor 11.1 27.8 38.9 61.1
b Severe  growth failure is considered to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was reached
during 1980s or before.
f Diffuse economy in which rent extraction channel is argued to operate in a fashion common to point source economies.
c Point source natural resource economy
Table 5 Growth Failure Economies and Natural Resource Endowment Type
d Diffuse natural resource economy




Degree of growth failure (%)
Note: Countries grouped according to geographical regions and listed in alphabetical order.
a Catastrophic  growth failure is defined to have occurred in those economies in which current per capita income level was
reached during 1960s or before.
Further evidence on natural resource endowment type, social fragmentation10 and
growth can be found in Table 6 which groups economies according to their level of
social fragmentation to two different groups (above or below average11) and then sorts
them by their natural resource endowment type (point source, diffuse, other12). Average
levels of social fragmentation and growth are provided for all subgroups. Both groups of
natural resource rich economies, point source and diffuse, have lower average growth
                                                
10 Social fragmentation and lack of social cohesion are used interchangeably. For this section, using the
former concept clarifies the discussion considerably.
11 The average level of social cohesion for this sample is 40.9. This average was compared to that of the
dataset (41.8). However, using either criterion produces identical groupings.
12 The ‘other’ natural resource category consists of resource poor economies as well as developed,
industrialized economies.16
rates over the period of 1960-99 than their resource poor and developed economy
counterparts. The lowest average annual growth, 0.2 percent, is recorded in point source
economies with above average social fragmentation.
Bolivia 0.4 Cameroon 0.6 Belgium 2.6
Burkina Faso 1.2 Chad -0.7 Canada 2.1
Central African Republic -0.7 Cote d'Ivoire 0.8 Indonesia 3.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. -3.0 Ghana -0.2 Kenya 1.3
Congo, Rep. 1.1 Guatemala 1.3 Mauritius 3.3
Ecuador 1.5 Guyana 0.6 Nepal 1.0
Niger -1.7 India 2.3 Philippines 1.2
Nigeria 0.3 Malawi 1.2 Singapore 5.9
Papua New Guinea 1.5 Malaysia 3.9 Spain 3.3
Peru 0.6 Mali Sri Lanka 2.8
Sierra Leone -1.2 Morocco 1.7 Switzerland 1.4
South Africa 0.8 Myanmar 1.6 United States 2.2
Togo 0.9 Pakistan 2.7
Trinidad and Tobago 2.5 Senegal -0.3
Zambia -1.3 Sudan 0.8
Thailand 4.5
Zimbabwe 1.1
Growth 0.2 1.4 2.5 (2.7)
Social fragmentation 69.9 68.9 60.3 (64.3)
Chile 2.5 Argentina 1.0 Australia 2.2
Dominican Republic 2.6 Brazil 2.4 Austria 2.8
Jamaica 0.5 Burundi 0.3 Colombia 1.8
Syrian Arab Republic 2.5 Costa Rica 1.9 Cyprus
Venezuela -0.4 Honduras 0.8 Denmark 2.1
Lesotho 2.9 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.1
Madagascar -1.2 El Salvador 0.7
Mexico 2.0 Finland 2.9
Nicaragua -0.8 France 2.6
Panama 2.0 Greece 3.4
Paraguay 1.7 Haiti -1.0
Rwanda -0.4 Hong Kong, China 5.1














Growth 1.5 1.1 2.7 (1.9)
Social fragmentation 11.2 16.7 12.4 (10.5)
Note: This table organizes economies into groups according to their natural resource endowment and level of social cohesion. Within groups, economies are 
listed in alphabetical order. Growth rates are percentages. Data in parenthesis are for resource poor economies. See appendix for data source information.
a Social fragmentation is proxied by an index that measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals of a country do not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group. Lower values of this index denote a lower level of social fragmentation (and hence  greater social cohesion). The countries are grouped 
according to their natural resource endowment type (point source, diffuse, and other) and whether they have above or below average social fragmentation. (Note 









































































Table 6 Growth according to Natural Resource Endowment and Level of Social Fragmentation 
Natural resource type
Point source  Diffuse Other17
Interestingly, the two groups of natural resource rich economies (point source and
diffuse) record different results in terms of average growth rates with groups that have
below average social fragmentation than those that have it above. In the case of point
source economies, the difference in the average growth is a significant 1.3 percent in
favor of economies with low social fragmentation, while for diffuse economies above
average social fragmentation group actually records an average growth of 0.3 percent
higher than its below average counterpart. This indicates that the level of social
fragmentation potentially influences countries’ economic performance in a distinct
manner, depending on their natural resource endowment type.
Another interesting feature in the data is that while the level of social fragmentation in
above average category is relatively equal across point source, diffuse, and poor
economies groups,13 their growth rates vary greatly across different natural resource
endowment types. Resource poor economies register the highest average annual growth
at 2.7 percent, while diffuse and point source economies record much lower ones at 1.4
and 0.2 percent, respectively. This provides evidence for the argument that it is not lack
of social cohesion per se that hampers growth, rather it is its coexistence with natural
resource richness, especially that of point source type that creates unfavorable
conditions for sustained economic growth.
In the case of below average social fragmentation, the variance in growth performance
across different natural resource endowment categories is not as pronounced. Resource
poor developing economies, once again, do register the highest average growth rate
(1.9 percent), however, between different natural resource endowment types, point
source economies register a higher average growth (1.5 percent) than that of diffuse
ones (1.1 percent). This, in turn, indicates that in societies characterized by social
cohesion, the differences in growth performance across natural resource endowment
types are not as significant.
Hence, the preliminary evidence in Table 6 indicates that natural resource rich
economies groups have experienced a lower average growth than their natural resource
poor and developed economy counterparts and that the growth rate differential between
the social fragmentation groups is significantly higher for point source economies
(1.3 percent) than in the case of diffuse ones (-0.3 percent) indicating that social
cohesion potentially has more important growth effects in the former group of
economies than in the latter one. To investigate this tendency further, the empirical
analysis continues in cross-country regression framework that investigates the influence
of these initial conditions on growth.
5.1 Initial conditions analysis for point source and diffuse economies
Table 7 displays the first set of growth regressions associating natural resource
endowment type with growth while capturing the convergence effect with initial income
and controlling for initial human capital endowments. In line with the previous findings
within the natural resources and growth literature, the results verify the disappointing
growth performance of natural resource rich economies. The first regression shows that,
given initial income and human capital, both types of natural resource rich economies
                                                
13 Group average data for resource poor economies are given in parentheses.18
have performed below average. Both point source and diffuse economies in this sample
exhibit a significantly lower growth, about 1.8 and 0.9 percent, respectively, than that of
an average economy. Variations in initial conditions explain about 37 percent of the
cross-country variation in growth rates within this sample.
Regression 2, in turn, extends the model to account for the lack of social cohesion. Its
coefficient estimate shows a negative, statistically nonrobust correlation with growth,
while the significance levels and sizes of other coefficients remain nearly identical. In
the next regression (3), the model is augmented by an interaction term to capture lack of
social cohesion in point source economies, which seeks to capture the effect that natural
resource endowment of point source type, when existing with absence of social
Table 7 Natural Resource Endowment, Absence of Social Cohesion, and Growth
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    growth of real per capita income
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.054 ** 0.061 *** 0.064 *** 0.078 *** -0.171 * -0.140 -0.130 -0.182 *
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.099) (0.096) (0.095) (0.108)
Initial income -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.007 *** 0.055 ** 0.048 * 0.046 * 0.062 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
(Initial income)
2 -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.005 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial human capital 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Natural resource type
Point source -0.018 *** -0.016 *** -0.003 0.005 -0.019 *** -0.018 *** -0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Diffuse -0.009 ** -0.009 ** -0.010 ** -0.002 -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.011 ** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lack of social cohesion -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.0003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Lack of social cohesion in
point source economies -0.028 ** -0.022 * -0.028 ** -0.023 **
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Regional dummy variables
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.018 *** -0.016 ***
(0.005) (0.004)
Latin America -0.016 *** -0.019 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
R
2 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.60 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.64
Adj. R
2 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.60
Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.  See appendix, section A3 for variable definitions.19
cohesion, has over and above the separate effects by point source natural resource
endowment and absence of social cohesion. The absence of social cohesion in point
source economies can be expected to have a negative influence on growth, which is
consistent with the estimated results, as the coefficient of this interaction term is
relatively large, negative, and significant at 5 percent level.
Interestingly, the absence of social cohesion in point source economies has a larger
negative effect on growth than the point source natural resource type in general (see
regressions 2 and 3). Most importantly, the inclusion of the interaction term renders the
qualitative variable for point source natural resource endowment statistically
insignificant. This provides support for the argument that natural resource endowment
itself is not necessarily a negative influence on growth, but rather that its coexistence
with lack of social cohesion can lead to disastrous growth outcomes. Moreover, the
explanatory power of the regression increases slightly to about 41 percent of the cross-
country variation in growth rates within this sample.
Regression 4 verifies that the effect captured in the previous regression is not merely
caused by regional effects, which are usually captured by Sub-Saharan African or Latin
American dummy variables in cross-country regressions. The inclusion of regional
dummy variables induces a minor reduction in the coefficient for the lack of social
cohesion in point source economies, which, nonetheless, remains significant at a 10
percent level. The regional dummy variables, however, cause a significant change in the
qualitative variable for diffuse economies, as its coefficient not only diminishes notably
in size, but also loses significance all together indicating that regional effects better
capture their below average performance. The significance of the regional dummy
variables is expected in the light of the Easterly and Levine (1998) findings of relevant
neighborhood effects and the Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) contribution on the
importance of geographical factors.
It is important to investigate whether the aforementioned results remain robust to the
inclusion of the square of initial income, as it has often been suggested that a quadratic
(nonlinear) relationship between initial income and the subsequent growth more
accurately captures the convergence effect. Regression 5 expands the reduced form
regression, associating the type of natural resource endowment, initial income, and
human capital to growth to the square of initial income. Though the initial income term
and its square both are statistically significant at 5 percent level and the explanatory
power of the regression is slightly better overall than without it; likewise, the natural
resource endowment coefficient remains roughly unchanged in terms of size and
significance. Augmenting this regression specification to the absence of social cohesion
in general, and to that in point source economies in particular, slightly increases the
explanatory power of the regression. Lack of social cohesion in point source economies
proves equally significant and of same size, but by itself, social cohesion does not seem
to exert significant influence. Once again, the inclusion of the absence of social
cohesion in point source economies renders the qualitative variable on point source
economies insignificant. This provides further evidence for the argument that point
source natural resource endowment coupled with lack of social cohesion potentially acts
through a political economy channel. Once again, this result is robust to the inclusion of
regional effects.
To investigate whether this effect is particular to economies characterized by point
source natural resource endowment or whether similar negative correlation can also be20
found also in the case of diffuse economies, the initial conditions regression are run on
diffuse economies and lack of social cohesion in a similar manner. The results are
displayed in Table 8. As before, the first and second regression verify the disappointing
growth performance of natural resource rich economies and the fact that lack of social
cohesion by itself does not produce a significant estimate. When the model is extended
to lack of social cohesion in general and that in diffuse economies in particular, the
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    growth of real per capita income
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.054 ** 0.061 *** 0.064 *** 0.079 *** -0.171 -0.127 -0.162
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.099) (0.098) (0.112)
Initial income -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.007 *** 0.055 ** 0.046 * 0.057 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
(Initial income)
2 -0.004 ** -0.003 * -0.004 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial human capital 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Natural resource type
Point source -0.018 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.005 -0.019 *** -0.016 *** -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Diffuse -0.009 ** -0.009 ** -0.017 *** -0.006 -0.010 ** -0.017 *** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Lack of social cohesion -0.009 -0.016 ** -0.012 * -0.013 * -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Lack of social cohesion in
diffuse economies 0.020 * 0.012 0.019 * 0.009
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Regional dummy variables
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.019 *** -0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.004)
Latin America -0.015 *** -0.018 ***
(0.004) (0.004)
R
2 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.59 0.43 0.46 0.62
Adj. R
2 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.54 0.40 0.41 0.57
C o u n t r i e s 8 2 8 28 2 8 28 28 28 2
* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.  See appendix, section A3 for variable definitions.
Table 8 Natural Resource Endowment, Absence of Social Cohesion in Diffuse Economies, and Growth21
coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at
10 percent level, indicating that absence of social cohesion in diffuse economies has the
opposite effect to that in point source economies. Furthermore, the negative coefficient
estimate for lack of social cohesion in general not only increases in size, but it also
gains significance at 5 percent level, while the qualitative variable for diffuse economies
in general remains negative and significant at 1 percent level. Interestingly, the
introduction of the interaction term causes the coefficient estimate for the diffuse
economies qualitative variable to increase in size and significance, in addition to which
it also renders the lack of social cohesion variable statistically significant while
increasing it in size as well. Though this effect is not robust to the inclusion of the
continental dummy variables since in regression 4 the interaction term looses
significance. Once again, the aforementioned results remain robust after the inclusion of
the square of initial income term. Hence, it can be concluded that the evidence derived
show support for the argument that the coexistence of lack of social cohesion in point
source economies and that in diffuse economies clearly have a distinct impact on
growth.
The negative correlation is specific to lack of social cohesion in point source economies
as the interaction term for diffuse economies shows a positive and significant
correlation for those specifications that do not control for regional dummy variables.
These regression results for point source and diffuse economies are robust to the
inclusion of a third natural resource endowment category, (qualitative variable for
natural resource poor economies).
To investigate whether the correlations found are robust to other initial conditions,
regression specification is modified to include Sachs and Warner (1997a) initial
conditions, that control for geographical and climate-related factors, such as whether a
country has access to sea (or is landlocked) or whether it is affected by tropical climate,
in addition to the quality of institutions. Table 9 reports the estimation results for the
regressions associating natural resource endowment type with growth while controlling
for Sachs and Warner (1997a) initial conditions. The results confirm the previous ones
in the case of point source economies. That is, the negative correlation of lack of social
cohesion in point source economies remains robustly negative and relatively large in
size and its introduction renders the qualitative variable for point source economies in
general insignificant in all of the specifications. In the case of diffuse economies, no
clear evidence for the pattern discovered is found. The interaction term between lack of
social cohesion and diffuse economies does not produce a significant estimate in any of
the specifications and hence it must be concluded that it is not robust to the inclusion of
these alternative initial conditions.
In sum, the initial conditions analysis shows clear results that indicate that natural
resource endowment type matters for growth, especially so in the presence of lack of
social cohesion. The regression results consistently show evidence for a negative
correlation between the lack of social cohesion in point source economies and growth,
while no such result is found in the case of economies rich in diffuse natural resources.
Hence, in the next section, the robustness of lack of social cohesion in point source
economies is investigated further by examining the significance of the interaction term
within cross-country growth regression framework.22
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GR6590
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.110 *** 0.127 *** 0.118 *** 0.131 *** -0.328 * -0.317 -0.289 -0.283
(0.003) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.180) (0.193) (0.180) (0.192)
Initial income -0.001 *** -0.014 *** -0.013 *** -0.015 *** 0.094 ** 0.093 ** 0.087 ** 0.086 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045)
(Initial income)
2 -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ACCESS -0.010 ** -0.009 ** -0.011 ** -0.009 ** -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TROPICS -0.013 ** -0.015 ** -0.014 ** -0.014 ** -0.011 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 ** -0.013 **
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
INSTITUTIONS 0.004 *** 0.004 ** 0.003 ** 0.004 ** 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Natural resource type
Point source -0.011 ** -0.001 -0.012 ** -0.001 -0.011 ** -0.012 ** -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Diffuse -0.008 * -0.010 * -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 ** -0.011 -0.012 ** -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Lack of social cohesion in
point source economies -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.020 * -0.020 **
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Lack of social cohesion in
diffuse economies -0.004 -0.006 0.0005 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R2 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.49
Adj. R
2 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.42
Countries 80 79 79 79 80 79 79 79
* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Table 9 Natural Resource Endowment Type and Sachs and Warner (1997b) Initial Conditions
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. See appendix, section A3 for variable definitions.
5.2 Robustness regressions for lack of social cohesion in point source economies
The lack of social cohesion in point source economies seems to exhibit a relatively
robust negative correlation with respect to growth in initial conditions framework, while
no such effect is found in the case of economies rich in diffuse natural resources. It is
important to investigate whether this correlation is robust in the presence of variables
deemed significant in other empirical growth studies as plausible determinants of
growth. To test for this, the approach used in Sachs and Warner (1997b) is applied by
including social fractionalization in point source economies variable (SFPS) in a
number of established growth regression specifications: Sachs and Warner (1997b),
Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), King and Levine (1993), and DeLong
and Summers (1991).23
Sachs and Warner (1997b) is the first contribution14 that brought forward robust
evidence of ‘natural resource curse’ in cross-country regression framework. Given its
pioneering role within empirical growth literature, it is of interest to investigate whether
lack of social cohesion in point source economies (SFPS) commands any explanatory
power within their specification that, in addition to initial income (LGDPEA70),
controls for natural resource intensity, measured by a share of primary exports (SXP),
open trade policy (SOPEN), investment (INV7089), rule of law (RL), and terms of trade
(DDT7090).
Table 10 displays the estimation results for the original specification by Sachs and
Warner (1997b) as well as it augmented by SFPS. The estimation results for the original
specification (regression 1) closely resembles that of the originators (see table 1,
regression 1.5 in Sachs and Warner 1997b). Interestingly, the introduction of SFPS into
the regression model produces expected results as its coefficient estimate is negative
and significant at 1 percent level. Furthermore, it increases the overall explanatory
power of the regression to nearly 80 percent of the cross-country variation, and in most
cases, it causes only slight changes in the coefficient estimates of other variables. Terms
of trade, which produces an insignificant coefficient within the original specification,
gains size and significance in the augmented specification, indicating that when
controlling for lack of social cohesion in point source economies, the positive
correlation of terms of trade with growth is more clearly picked up by this cross-country
regression specification. Though an interesting result, the most important finding of this
estimation exercise is that the introduction of the SFPS into the Sachs and Warner
specification improves its overall explanatory power, in addition to which the
interaction term’s coefficient estimate is robustly negative, hence consistent with the
results found within the initial conditions framework.
The next specification to which SFPS is introduced is Barro (1991). Though not the first
cross-country growth regression contribution, it widely enjoys the status as a seminal
growth contribution to this literature. Table 11 displays the estimation results for Barro
(1991) original specification and it augmented by SFPS. The original specification
controls for primary and secondary schooling (PRI70 and SEC70), share of government
consumption (net of military and education expenditure) (GVXDXE), revolutions and
coups (REVCOUP), assassinations (ASSASSP), deviation of investment price level
(PPI70DEV), as well as investment (INV7089) and initial income (LGDPEA70). Once
again, the estimated equation roughly resembles the original estimate.15 The
introduction of the SFPS interaction term increases the explanatory power of this
regression specification and its estimated coefficient is negative and significant giving
further support for the correlation found so far.
                                                
14 Or more accurately, the earlier version of the same paper, Sachs and Warner (1995).
15 As Sachs and Warner (1997b) note the difference in the time period of the analysis causes slight
changes in the coefficient estimates. Furthermore, the number of economies in the sample varies along
with the new variables introduced. Hence though estimated coefficients have largely the same signs,
slight differences in them from the original Barro estimates can be observed. This is not disconcerting
to the analysis since its focus is on investigating whether the negative correlation between lack of
social cohesion in point source economies remains robust in regression specifications in which a
number of ‘established’ determinants of growth are controlled.24
Table 10 Sachs and Warner (1997c)
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GEA7090
Independent variable (1) (2)
SFPS -1.93 ***
(0.528)
LGDPEA70 -1.78 *** -1.74 ***
(0.264) (0.253)
SXP -10.34 *** -7.97 ***
(1.327) (1.717)
SOPEN 1.35 *** 1.23 ***
(0.324) (0.269)
INV7089 0.80 *** 0.96 ***
(0.298) (0.285)
RL 0.41 *** 0.38 ***
(0.133) (0.128)







* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
See appendix, section A4 for variable definitions and sources.
Table 11 Barro (1991)
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GEA7090
Independent variable (1) (2)
SFPS -3.47 ***
(0.892)
LGDPEA70 -1.31 *** -1.09 **
(0.459) (0.421)










PPI70DEV -0.34 -0.53 **
(0.302) (0.265)







* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
See appendix, section A4 for variable definitions and sources.
Table 12, in turn, displays the estimation results for the introduction of SFPS interaction
term to a basic growth regression specification by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
Once again, controlling for lack of social cohesion in point source economies within this
framework causes an improvement in the explanatory power of the overall regression
specification, in addition to which the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is
negative and highly significant at 1 percent level.
The last two specifications within which the robustness of the negative correlation
between lack of social cohesion in point source economies and growth is tested are King
and Levine (1993) and DeLong and Summers (1991). The estimation results for these
specifications are displayed in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. The negative correlation
between SFPS and growth is robust to these specifications as well, in addition to which
its introduction improves their explanatory power as in all other specifications.25
Table 12 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GEA7090
Independent variable (1) (2)
SFPS -1.92 ***
(0.587)
LGDPEA70 -1.37 *** -1.41 ***
(0.246) (0.254)
GP7090 -0.74 *** -0.59 ***
(0.210) (0.209)







* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
See appendix, section A4 for variable definitions and sources.
Table 13 King and Levine (1993)
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GEA7090
Independent variable (1) (2)
SFPS -1.53 **
(0.700)











* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
See appendix, section A4 for variable definitions and sources.26
Table 14 DeLong and Summers (1991)
Model:     OLS
Dependent variable:    GEA7090
Independent variable (1) (2)
SFPS -2.56 **
(1.061)




EQUIP 26.22 27.73 ***
(10.646) (8.769)







* Statistically significant at 10% level
** Statistically significant at 5% level
***Statistically significant at 1% level
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
See appendix, section A4 for variable definitions and sources.
To conclude, the most notable fact that is evident from the estimation results of these
robustness regressions is that in all cases, the inclusion of SFPS improves the overall
explanatory power of the original specification between 4 to 15 percent. Furthermore, in
all specifications, SFPS variable is highly significant at least at 5 percent level of
significance, hence providing relatively robust results in support for the strong negative
correlation between lack of social cohesion in point source economies and growth.
6 Conclusions
This study has investigated growth failures by drawing on two different literatures that
seek to explain the below average growth performance of African and natural resource
rich economies. In doing so, it brings the relevance of natural resource endowment type27
to the forefront and shows evidence for it within initial conditions and cross-country
growth regression frameworks. It broadens the debate on the effects of natural resource
endowment on growth into different types of endowment and how political economy
factors matter as argued within development economics literature by Hirschman (1981)
and more recently by Auty (2001). Hence, the paper has examined whether the type of
natural resource endowment has a potential to influence growth through political
economy considerations.
The innovation of this paper is to widen the cross-country growth regression framework
to natural resource endowment type and to tie it into political economy considerations
through the absence of social cohesion proxy. In doing so, this work also addresses a
methodological shortcoming in the African growth literature by seeking to bridge a gap
between the cross-country studies and the case study literature on this issue. More
specifically, natural resource endowment type, cited as an important influence on
growth within development economics case study literature, is incorporated and tested
in cross-country growth framework. In the same vein, this contribution can be
considered as an empirical test of Hirschman (1981) theory of linkages in staple
production.
The empirical results brought forward in this study find support for the argument that
mere natural resource richness does not retard growth, rather the type of natural
resource endowment matters as well as its interaction with political economy
considerations which potentially operate through a fiscal linkage as argued by
Hirschman (1981). Namely, it is not just point source natural resource endowment that
retards growth, rather it is its coexistence with lack of social cohesion that consistently
exhibits a robust negative correlation with growth within initial conditions and growth
regressions frameworks.
The correlation is found to be relatively robust, as it remains significant in the presence
of various initial conditions variables as well as across different growth regression
specifications that control for a lieu of established determinants of growth. Though it is
important to recognize that this correlation is found within cross-country framework and
hence no specific policy recommendations should be made based on these results, the
results do find support for the immense difficulties developing countries have and the
challenges they face in managing the fiscal linkage. Recognizing that political economy
(or fiscal management) of resource rents in economies characteristic of primary
production with limited production and consumption linkages has potentially posed an
insuperable challenge for many developing economies, currently suffering from a long-
term growth failure, is a step closer to shifting attention towards development policies
that aim to maximize the welfare for the society as a whole as oppose to a faction of it
successful in capturing those rents.
As mentioned before, there is evidence that certain economies, such as Botswana, have
been able to manage the fiscal linkage in a manner that maximizes the general welfare
of their society as reflected by their ability to pass from one stage of development to the
next. The recognition of natural resource endowment type and the ensuing political
economy considerations points to one of the possible sources of the so-called curse of
natural resources, namely, the notable challenge posed by the management of the fiscal
linkage.28
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Appendix
A1 Tables
Table A1 List of Economies
ARG Argentina MUS Mauritius
AUS Australia MEX Mexico
AUT Austria MAR Morocco
BGD Bangladesh MMR Myanmar
BEL Belgium NPL Nepal
BOL Bolivia NLD Netherlands
BRA Brazilf NZL New Zealand
BFA Burkina Faso NIC Nicaragua
BDI Burundi NER Niger
CMR Cameroon NGA Nigeria
CAN Canada NOR Norway
CAF Central African Republic PAK Pakistan
TCD Chad PAN Panama
CHL Chile PNG Papua New Guinea
COL Colombia PRY Paraguay
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. PER Peru
COG Congo, Rep. PHL Philippines
CRI Costa Rica PRT Portugal
CIV Cote d'Ivoire RWA Rwanda
CYP Cyprus SAU Saudi Arabia
DNK Denmark SEN Senegal
DOM Dominican Republic SLE Sierra Leone
ECU Ecuador SGP Singapore
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. SOM Somalia
SLV El Salvador ZAF South Africa
FIN Finland ESP Spain
FRA France LKA Sri Lanka
GHA Ghana SDN Sudan
GRC Greece SWE Sweden
GTM Guatemala CHE Switzerland
GUY Guyana SYR Syrian Arab Republic
HTI Haiti THA Thailand
HND Honduras TGO Togo
HKG Hong Kong, China TTO Trinidad and Tobago
IND India TUN Tunisia
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. GBR United Kingdom
IRL Ireland USA United States
ISR Israel URY Uruguay
ITA Italy VEN Venezuela
JAM Jamaica ZMB Zambia












A2 Stage of development groups
To avoid sample selection bias, the income groups are defined according to country’s
income status in 1960 (i.e., in the beginning of the period). Since the World
Development Report categorizing countries into different income groups was first
published in 1978, an identical method for determining income groupings to that of the
contemporary period is not available. The income definition used by UNCTAD to
determine least developed countries in 1972 was considered as an alternative, since
today their income criterion is matched to that of the World Bank low-income
economies. However, it was inapplicable because it pertained to a later time period,
nearly a decade later than the initial period, and, in addition, it is based on per capita
GDP as oppose to GNP as per the World Bank Atlas method.
Therefore, to determine 1960 income groups, countries were separated into different
stages of development groups by observing the earliest per capita GNP estimate (circa
1960), calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. This analysis led to the following
stage of development groupings. Low-income countries are considered to be those with
per capita GNP equal to $170 or below. Lower middle-income economies are those with
income between $170-$300. Upper middle-income countries, in turn, are defined as
those economies with per capita GNP between $340-890. Lastly, the high-income
country group contains economies with per capita income greater than $890. For those
countries with deficient estimates of per capita GNP in the series in question, their
relative income status was defined based on the earliest estimate available with
reference to the approximate growth rate over the period.
Based on the above criteria, the income groupings for 1960 are as follows (group
averages and country estimates of per capita GNP included in it are in the parentheses.
Per capita GNP estimate is not reported when the economy’s relative income status was
defined based on the earliest available estimate with reference to the growth rate over
the period):
1 High-income economies ($1848):
Argentina ($1,110), Australia ($2,010), Austria ($1,210), Belgium ($1,610), Canada
($2,440), Denmark ($1,900), Finland ($1,570), France ($1,820), Israel ($1,330), Italy
($1,140), Netherlands ($1,410), New Zealand ($1,960), Norway ($1,880), Sweden
($2,570) Switzerland ($2,340), United Kingdom ($1,720), United States ($3,390). [17]
2 Middle-income economies ($402):
Upper middle-income ($585): Chile ($670), Costa Rica ($390), Cyprus, Greece ($740),
Hong Kong ($620), Iran, Ireland ($890), Jamaica ($600), Japan ($810), Jordan, Mexico
($450), Panama ($510), Peru ($340), Portugal ($420), Saudi Arabia ($430), Singapore
($540), South Africa ($500), Spain ($600), Trinidad and Tobago ($740), Turkey,
Uruguay ($700), Venezuela. [22]
Lower middle-income ($246): Bolivia, Brazil ($230), Colombia ($300), Congo, Dem.
Rep. ($220), Cote d’Ivoire ($200), Dominican Republic ($270), Ecuador ($210),
El Salvador ($280), Ghana ($210), Guatemala ($300), Guyana ($280), Honduras
($200), Lebanon, Liberia ($220), Malaysia ($300), Mauritius ($300), Morocco ($190),33
Paraguay ($200), Syrian Arab Republic ($270), Tunisia ($230), Zambia ($210),
Zimbabwe ($300). [22]
3 Low-income developing economies ($109)
Bangladesh ($110), Burkina Faso ($70), Burundi ($80), Cameroon ($130), Central
African Republic ($80), Chad ($110), Congo, Rep. ($160), Egypt ($160), Haiti ($70),
India, Indonesia ($70), Kenya ($100), Korea, Rep. ($130), Lesotho ($60), Madagascar
($130), Malawi ($50), Mali ($60), Mauritania ($120), Myanmar, Nepal ($70),
Nicaragua ($160), Niger ($170), Nigeria ($220), Pakistan ($100), Papua New Guinea
($140), Philippines ($170), Rwanda ($40), Senegal, Sierra Leone ($160), Somalia ($70),
Sri Lanka ($160) Sudan ($110), Thailand ($120), Togo ($110). [34]
A3 Variable definitions and sources for initial conditions analysis
ACCESS: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an economy is landlocked;
0 otherwise. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
DIFFUSE ECONOMIES: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an economy is a
diffuse natural resource economy; 0 otherwise. Economy is defined as diffuse natural
resource economy if it is natural resource rich and its merchandise exports are not oil
and mineral dominated.
INCOME GROWTH 1960-99: Growth of per capita GDP in constant local currency units
over the period 1960-99, logarithmic end point calculation. Source: World Bank (2001).
INITIAL HUMAN CAPITAL: Total years of schooling for population aged over 15 years.
Source: Barro and Lee (2001) and World Bank (2001).
INITIAL PER CAPITA INCOME: Logarithm of real per capita income in 1960 (Chain
index). Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2001).
INITIAL PER CAPITA INCOME SQUARED: Square of initial per capita income. Source: see
above.
INSTITUTIONS: An index of institutional quality, an arithmetic average of indicators for
bureaucratic quality, rule of law, government corruption, expropriation risk, and
government repudiation of contracts. Data published in International Country Risk
Guide by the PRS Group and discussed in Knack and Keefer (1995). Source: Sachs and
Warner (1997a).
LACK OF SOCIAL COHESION:  Proxied by (Miklukho-Maklai) ethnolinguistic
fractionalization index that measures the probability that two randomly selected
individuals do not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Easterly and
Levine (1997).
LACK OF SOCIAL COHESION IN DIFFUSE ECONOMIES:  An interaction term between
diffuse economies and lack of social cohesion variables.
LACK OF SOCIAL COHESION IN POINT SOURCE ECONOMIES: An interaction term
between point source economies and lack of social cohesion variables.34
LATIN AMERICA: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an economy is located in
the Latin American and the Caribbean region; 0 otherwise.
NATURAL RESOURCE POOR ECONOMIES: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an
economy is natural resource poor; 0 otherwise. Natural resource poor economies are
defined as those economies with per capita cropland less than 0.3 hectares per person
following Auty (2001). Source: World Bank (2001)
NATURAL RESOURCE RICH ECONOMIES: Natural resource rich economies are defined as
those economies with per capita cropland greater than 0.3 hectares per person in 1970
per person following Auty (2001). Source: World Bank (2001)
PER CAPITA INCOME: Per capita GDP in constant local currency units. Source: World
Bank (2001).
PER CAPITA INCOME GROWTH: Growth of per capita income, logarithmic end point
calculation. Source: World Bank (2001).
POINT SOURCE ECONOMIES: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an economy is
a point source natural resource economy; 0 otherwise. Following Auty (2001), economy
is defined as point source natural resource economy if it is natural resource rich, its
resource base is dominantly mineral or oil-based, and the exports of these products
exceed 40 percent of its total exports. Source: World Bank (2001).
POPULATION: Total population in 1960. Source: World Bank (2001).
SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION: See the definition for lack of social cohesion.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: Qualitative variable that takes the value 1 if an economy is
located in the Sub-Saharan African region; 0 otherwise.
TROPICS: Fraction of a country’s territory that is affected by tropical climate. Source:
Sachs and Warner (1997a).
A4 Variable definitions and sources for robustness regressions
ASSASSP: Annual number of assassinations per million inhabitants over the period
1970 to 1985. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See dataset or source for
further details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
DTT7090: Annual growth in the terms of trade between 1970 and 1990. See source for
further details. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
EQUIP: Equipment investment spending as a share of GDP, averaged over the period
of 1970 to 1985. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See dataset or source for
further details. Source: DeLong and Summers (1991).
GEA7090: Growth of GDP per economically active population over the period 1970
and 1990. See source for further details. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
GP7090: Annual population growth over the period 1970 to 1990. Source: Sachs and
Warner (1997a).35
GVXDXE: Real government consumption, excluding spending on military and
education, as a share of GDP. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See source
for further details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
LINV7089: Logarithm of real gross domestic investment share in GDP over the period
1970 to 1989. See source for further details. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
KLLLY70: Financial intermediaries’ liabilities and currency in circulation as a share of
GDP. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See source for further details.
Source: King and Levine (1993).
KLLSEC: Logarithm of secondary schooling years in the population between 1970 and
1989. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See source for further details.
Source: King and Levine (1993).
LFG: Labor force growth. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See source for
further details. Source: DeLong and Summers (1991).
LGDPEA70: Real GDP per economically active population in 1970. See source for
further details. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
NES: Investment in other than equipment (structures and goods), an average over the
period 1970 to 1985. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See dataset or source
for further details. Source: DeLong and Summers (1991)
PPI70DEV: Deviation of the logarithm of investment price level from the sample mean
in 1970. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See dataset or source for further
details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
PRI70: Primary school enrollment rate in 1970. Series used from Sachs and Warner
(1997a). See source for further details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
REVCOUP: Average number of revolutions and coups per year over the period 1970 to
1985. Series used from Sachs and Warner (1997a). See the dataset or source for further
details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
RL: Rule of Law index, variable proxies citizen’s willingness to accept institutions that
mediate disputes and design and implement laws. Low values indicate ‘low willingness’
and vice versa. Data published in International Country Risk Guide by the PRS Group
and discussed in Knack and Keefer (1995). Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
SEC70: Secondary school enrollment rate in 1970. Series used from Sachs and Warner
(1997a). See source for further details. Source: Barro and Lee (1994).
SFPS: Social fractionalization in point source economies. Source: See section A3 in
this appendix.
SOPEN: Years economy rated as open between 1970 and 1990, according to Sachs and
Warner (1995), divided by the total number of years in the period. See source for further
details. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997a).
SXP: Share of primary product exports in GNP in 1970. Primary products include fuel
and non-fuel commodities. See source for further details. Source: Sachs and Warner
(1997a).